Search Decisions

Decision Text

CG | BCMR | Enlisted Performance | 2005-129
Original file (2005-129.pdf) Auto-classification: Denied
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                BCMR Docket No. 2005-129 
 
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 

 

 
 

FINAL DECISION 

 
AUTHOR:  Andrews, J. 
 
 
This  proceeding  was  conducted  according  to  the  provisions  of  section  1552  of 
title 10 and section 425 of title 14 of the United States Code.  The Chair docketed it on 
June 24, 2005, upon receipt of the completed application.   
 
 
members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This  final  decision,  dated  April  5,  2006,  is  signed  by  the  three  duly  appointed 

APPLICANT’S REQUEST AND ALLEGATIONS 

 
 
The applicant asked the Board to remove from his military record his relief for 
cause as the Officer in Charge (OIC) of a Coast Guard station in 2003, as well as his per-
formance  evaluation  dated  September  30,  2003,  and  Administrative  Remarks  (“page 
7s”) related to his relief for cause.  
 
 
The  applicant  alleged  that  when  he  was  relieved  for  cause  in  2003,  he  was 
unknowingly suffering from depression caused by his involvement in both the imme-
diate and long-term disaster relief following the attacks on the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001.  Prior to this period, he alleged, he had “advanced quickly, been 
recognized for [his] actions, leadership and conduct and had not one single derogatory 
entry  in  [his]  service  record.”    The  applicant  stated  that  he  did  not  dispute  his  “un-
toward behavior and actions” as OIC or that they warranted a loss of confidence and 
that he has taken full responsibility for them.  He stated that during the period in ques-
tion, he was “argumentative, detached, and apathetic,” he gained weight at an alarming 
rate, his health declined, and he felt “fatigued to the point of not being able to work.” 
 

 
The applicant stated that since being relieved for cause, he has received counsel-
ing  from  a  psychologist  and  from  the  Coast  Guard’s  Employee  Assistance  Program 
(EAP) staff and now realizes that he was suffering from severe depression.  The appli-
cant stated that while working in New York Harbor, he did not receive any debriefing 
or  counseling,  and  that  “it  is  honestly  debatable  as  to  whether  I  actually  needed  it  at 
that time.”  However, after he was assigned as OIC of a station on the West Coast and 
was “able to ‘relax,’” he started “to reprocess the events of the tragedy, largely forced 
by having to relive the events through the nearly daily questions and interest of those 
around me, those who had not been there.” 
 
 
The applicant stated that since receiving counseling, he has “been not only able 
to recognize my condition, but to come to grips with it and ha[s] emerged fully engaged 
and back on track.”  The applicant argued that “by failing to recognize and address my 
condition,  I  have  needlessly  suffered  a  great  injustice.”    He  stated  that  the  relief  for 
cause “is severely debilitating to my career and stifles my chances for advancement, as 
well  as  the  chance  to  once  again  assume  the  leadership  and  responsibility  of  a  Com-
mand  position.”    He  stated  that  “due  to  reasons  beyond  my  control,  the  behavior  in 
question was truly not who I am and I simply want the chance to prove it.” 
 
 
In support of his allegations, the applicant submitted a statement from a Coast 
Guard EAP counselor.  The counselor stated that he “cannot attest to [the applicant’s] 
mental functioning at the time he was removed from his position as OIC …, but after 
speaking with him it appears that [he] was displaying some signs of depression which 
apparently went unnoticed by his command.”  The EAP counselor stated that the appli-
cant described  becoming more isolated from other people, feeling less attached to his 
work, getting less work done, gaining forty pounds, and sleeping more.  He stated that 
the applicant had also had brief suicidal ideation.  The EAP counselor stated that these 
symptoms indicate that the applicant met the criteria for a diagnosis of Major Depres-
sive Episode while he was OIC.  He further stated that “[i]t cannot be stated or implied 
that if [the applicant] had received an earlier intervention with psychological treatment 
when his symptoms of depression first appeared things would have turned out differ-
ent.  It can be stated, however, that when treatment has been offered people have been 
able to make positive use of treatment to get back on track with their life sooner.” 
 

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD 

 
 
The applicant enlisted in the Coast Guard in 1991 as a seaman with prior service 
in  the  Army,  Army  Reserve,  and  National  Guard.    He  became  a  xxxxxxxxxx  and 
advanced to pay grade E-7/chief petty officer.  
 
On  September  11,  2001,  the  applicant  was  serving  as  the  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  a 
 
Coast  Guard  station  near  Manhattan.    In  addition,  he  was  the  xxxxxxxxxxxx  at  the 
station.  He had previously received very high marks on his performance evaluations, 

including  marks  of  7 (out  of  a  possible  7)  in  such  performance  categories  as  stamina, 
communicating,  loyalty,  setting  an  example,  and  adaptability.    On  his  performance 
evaluation dated September 30, 2001, the applicant received two marks of 5, seventeen 
marks of 6, and five marks of 7 (for directing others, adaptability, professional knowl-
edge, administrative ability, and stamina).  His supervisor wrote that he “worked six-
teen to twenty hour days during the WTC attack, first performing the duties as the sen-
ior person in charge of the physical security of the station and then as one of the OOD 
watchstanders who organized the crew and small boat rotation in support of Operation 
Guarding Liberty.”  The applicant received  an Achievement Medal for “superior per-
formance of duty from 11 September 2001 to 22 October 2001.”   
 
 
On  June  4,  2002,  the  applicant  reported  for  duty  as  the  Officer  in  Charge  of  a 
station on the West Coast.  On his performance evaluation dated September 30, 2002, 
the applicant received one mark of 5, twenty-one marks of 6, and two marks of 7.  He 
was  recommended  for  promotion,  as  he  had  been  on  every  one  of  his  previous  eval-
uations. 
 
 
On May 29, 2003, the Group Commander counseled the applicant and the chief 
warrant officer who served as commanding officer (CO) of the parent command of the 
applicant’s  station  concerning  problems  of  communication  and  cooperation  between 
the station and the parent command, which had increased since the applicant became 
the station OIC.  The Group Commander’s notes indicate that the Deputy Commander 
had  already  counseled  them  about  the  same  concerns  on  January  31,  2003.    The 
applicant’s  improper  purchase  of  two  computers  and  continuing  communications 
problems  had  convinced  the  Group  Commander  that  another  counseling  session  was 
necessary.  The Group Commander noted that although it was not easy to distinguish 
who  was  causing  the  problems  and  communications  problems  were  usually  a  “two-
way  street,”  he  suspected  that  the  applicant  was  not  listening  to  his  CO,  was  not 
keeping  the  CO  informed  of  his  actions,  and  was  bypassing  the  CO  on  many  issues.  
The Group Commander wrote that he “use[d] the full force of my position to get their 
attention  …  to  ensure  they  both  understood  what  I  expected  and  that  the 
communications  issue  must  be  resolved,  or  I  would  consider  relief  of  one  or  both  of 
them.” 
 
Letter Incident Report 
 
 
On  July  23,  2003,  the  Group  Commander  ordered  LCDR  D  to  investigate  the 
leadership, competency, and conduct of the applicant and the relationship between the 
station and the parent command.  On August 6, 2003, LCDR D reported to the Group 
Commander that he had completed his investigation and that eight of ten allegations 
that were made against the applicant during the course of his investigation had been 
substantiated but that he did not believe they warranted the applicant’s removal.  He 

recommended that the applicant receive leadership training and more support from the 
parent command. 
 
LCDR D stated that interviews with the applicant’s subordinates indicated that 
 
his “normal workday consists of coming in some time around 0800 and leaving at 1100, 
sometimes returning after 1600 to go into his office and get on the Internet.  Additional-
ly, [the applicant] never wears an appropriate uniform; he wears sweats and a T-shirt or 
coveralls as his uniform of the day.”  In addition, the applicant and a subordinate had 
worn outfits resembling police SWAT team uniforms when providing security during a 
4th of July event at the port.  LCDR D noted that “because of other issues surrounding 
the material condition and cleanliness of the unit, [the applicant’s] presence and direc-
tion are obviously needed.”  He stated that the “overall material condition of the unit is 
marginal at best” and that the applicant had not communicated the station’s needs to 
the parent command. 
 
 
LCDR D stated that the applicant’s CO reported that on one occasion the appli-
cant  had  refused  to  come  to  the  parent  command  for  a  meeting  with  his  CO,  which 
reflected a “lack of respect and borderline insubordination.”  LCDR D stated that the 
applicant’s lack of respect toward his CO was “a major contributing factor to the poor 
relationship between [the parent station and the applicant’s station].” 
 
 
LCDR D reported that the applicant appeared to be “running a business out of 
his Coast Guard office selling guns.”  He had been seen handling guns for sale during 
normal work hours and an investigation of the applicant’s office computer use showed 
that he had visited numerous gun information and gun manufacturer websites.  LCDR 
D  recommended  that  the  applicant  be  ordered  to  review  and  sign  the  Coast  Guard’s 
“limited  use”  policy  and  to  stop  conducting  his  private  business  from  the  station’s 
office. 
 
 
LCDR  D  reported  that  the  applicant  had  “lost  credibility  with  the  crew”  as  he 
had  made  many  promises  but  rarely  followed  through.    One  crewmember  reported 
catching the applicant in several lies.  Others reported that the applicant had told dif-
ferent stories of how he had obtained a poster of “ground zero” in Manhattan, which he 
kept on his office wall. 
 
 
LCDR D reported that on April 18, 2003, the applicant had purchased one laptop 
and one desktop computer with funds for a Learning Center without the approval of 
his  CO,  and  neither  computer  had  ever  been  used  for  educational  purposes  at  the 
Learning Center.  The applicant kept the laptop at his house, and the desktop was not 
hooked up to the Internet but was used by a first class petty officer to play games.  After 
LDCR D asked the applicant to return the laptop to determine how it had been used, it 
was returned with all information erased even though it had obviously been well used. 
 

 
LCDR D reported that during a visit by the District Command (a rear admiral) 
and the Group Commander in July 2003, the applicant had criticized the parent com-
mand  for  not  timely  processing  five  alcohol  incidents  when  only  one  of  the  five  was 
actually delayed and the applicant himself had not pursued a timely resolution of the 
case.  In addition, LCDR R reported that the applicant’s story about the circumstances 
of the repainting and remodeling of his office differed from that of the members who 
did  the  work  and  that  the  applicant  “appears  to  be  shading  the  truth  in  order  not  to 
appear to have made someone at the unit work late into the night to complete a project 
simply for the Admiral’s visit.” 
 
 
LCDR D stated that several factors contributed to the poor working relationship 
between the parent command and the applicant’s station.  He reported that station per-
sonnel  sometimes  received  different  information  from  the  parent  command  and  the 
applicant and were “caught in the middle,” not knowing which superior’s order to fol-
low.  In addition, the applicant’s subordinates reported that he had “openly ridiculed 
and  challenged  the  [parent]  command.”    LCDR  D  noted  that  some  of  the  applicant’s 
subordinates supported him and reported that they were better trained and ready for 
operations than they had been before the applicant’s arrival.  The station had received 
excellent performance marks during a recent visit by a Training Team.  LCDR D con-
cluded that the applicant “had great expectations when he first arrived … .  [H]owever, 
when he ran into difficulties accomplishing those goals he became frustrated and disen-
gaged from his parent command.” 
 
Request for Temporary Relief for Cause 
 
 
On  August  11,  2003,  the  Group  Commander  forwarded  the  Letter  Incident 
Report  to  the  District  Commander  with  a  request  that  the  applicant  be  temporarily 
relieved  for  cause  pending  a  formal,  permanent  relief  for  cause.    The  Group  Com-
mander stated that he had lost confidence in the applicant’s leadership.  He noted that 
the  applicant  had  previously  been  counseled  by  the  Deputy  Group  Commander  on 
January  31,  2003,  about  communications  with  his  CO  and  following  the  chain  of 
command  and  then  again  by  himself  on  May  29,  2003,  on  similar  issues.    On  both 
occasions,  the  applicant  “failed  to  make  the  required  corrections  in  his  attitude  and 
leadership.”  He noted that he had temporarily reassigned the applicant to the parent 
command. 
 
 
The Group Commander also wrote that when he first visited the station in June 
2002, the applicant made him “feel that I had imposed on him and his personnel” by 
being one hour late due to his visits to other units and traffic.  Three of the applicant’s 
priorities  seemed odd  to  him:    turning  a  tennis  court  into  a  paintball  course,  clearing 
shrubs off a hill behind the station, and switching the main entrance to the back of the 
building.    He  decided  that  the  applicant  “was  different  and  had  a  different  way  of 
looking at things and setting priorities.” 

 
 
Shortly  thereafter,  the  Group  Commander  wrote,  communications  problems 
between the applicant and his CO began to surface.  He trusted the CO, but the appli-
cant “always had an answer for everything.”  By May 2003, he suspected that the appli-
cant “was driving a wedge between his unit and his parent unit” and trying to prove 
that  “his  unit  should  be  a  stand  alone  unit.”    He  stated  that  the  applicant  originally 
claimed to have received his CO’s approval to purchase two computers for the Learning 
Center but then admitted he did not.  The CO had only authorized him to research the 
matter and any research would have revealed that the District would be buying com-
puters for the Learning Center. 
 
 
During the District Commander’s visit, the Group Commander stated, the appli-
cant’s  station  was  not  ready  and  he  “walked  around  amazed  at  the  disorganized 
appearance  of  the  unit.”    In  addition,  the  applicant  “essentially  placed  [his  CO]  on 
report for not acting promptly on a prior alcohol incident,” which he had only raised 
with  his  CO  once  before,  and  then  “made  it  sound  like  there  were  a  total  of  5  unre-
solved incidents pending at his unit when these [other] incidents had [recently] taken 
place at the parent command.”  The applicant further complained to the District Com-
mander that the unit  did not have enough  money to operate—a complaint which the 
Group Commander had not heard before.   
 
 
The  Group  Commander  stated  that  because  he  detected  that  “something  was 
going on with the crew that seemed abnormal,” he asked LCDR D and the Command 
Master Chief to investigate.  Their reports alarmed him sufficiently to cause him to lose 
confidence  in  the  applicant’s  leadership.    The  applicant  was  usually  at  work  for  only 
three  hours  a  day  and  would  surf  the  Internet  for  up  to  two  hours  on  his  personal 
business.    The  Group  Commander  discussed  the  report  of  the  investigation  with  the 
applicant, who seemed to believe he had done nothing wrong and blamed everything 
on  a  lack  of  support  from  the  parent  command.    However,  the  Group  Commander 
knew  that  the  parent  command  was  “making  an  extraordinary  effort  to  correct  some 
deficiencies that [the applicant] allowed to develop and should have taken care of on 
his own.”  After this meeting he determined that many members in the chain of com-
mand “doubted [the applicant’s] sincerity and felt that he had been arrogant and was 
not willing to admit he had made mistakes.”  In addition, “everyone agreed that they 
did not think he actually could change,” as he “would require an extensive amount of 
direct  supervision.”    The  Group  Commander  concluded  that  although  the  applicant 
was a very good trainer, “[h]e was also their friend … he was not their leader and he 
was not aligned with the desires of his parent command or the Group.”  
  

On August 14, 2003, LCDR D submitted a supplement to his report.  He stated 
that all personnel at the station reported that the applicant “never wore the prescribed 
uniform of the day … and that he would generally wear either coveralls with no name 
tag or rank insignia or he would wear sweats/shorts and a T-shirt on days that the unit 

had scheduled sports … generally Tuesdays and Thursdays of each week.”  Two mem-
bers stated that they could not remember ever seeing the applicant in uniform.  LCDR D 
further  stated  that  nine  petty  officers  at  the  station  had  corroborated  the  applicant’s 
habit of working from 8:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and sometimes returning after 4:00 p.m.  
He noted that the applicant stated that he had been leaving work early for three months 
to care for his wife or take her to medical appointments. 
 
Temporary Relief for Cause 
 
 
On August 14, 2003, the District Commander notified the applicant that he was 
temporarily relieved for cause, that he had been assigned legal counsel, and that he had 
a  right  to  submit  a  statement  on  his  own  behalf.    On  August  18,  2003,  the  applicant 
acknowledged the notification. 
 
 
On  August  20,  2003,  Ensign  S  submitted  another  Letter  Incident  Report  on  his 
investigation into an encounter between the applicant and a station crewmember, BM2 
X.  Ensign S stated that on the night in question, the applicant had been filing the grip 
on a Colt 45 pistol in his garage when he showed it to MK2 M, who lived nearby.  The 
magazine was not in the gun.  When BM2 X drove into the parking lot, the applicant 
told MK2 M that he wanted to show the pistol to BM2 X, as they had discussed guns in 
the past.  The applicant walked over to BM2 X, showed him the pistol, and told him that 
he had been working on it and that it was not loaded.  He handed the gun to BM2 X 
briefly and asked him if he liked the new grip.  The applicant accused BM2 X of making 
negative  comments  about  him  to  LCDR  D  during  the  prior  investigation.    Ensign  S 
wrote that the “conversation ended shortly thereafter with [the applicant] stating that 
he was going to go shoot something.”  BM2 X reported to the new, acting OIC that he 
had not felt threatened during the encounter with the applicant but that the applicant’s 
statement made him feel “very uneasy.”  Ensign S recommended that the applicant be 
counseled with a page 7. 
 
Applicant’s Statement Concerning His Temporary Relief for Cause 
 
 
On  August  22,  2003,  the  applicant  submitted  a  statement  to  the  District  Com-
mander concerning his temporary relief for cause.  He stated that there were communi-
cations problems between the station and the parent command but that “these problems 
cannot be laid at the feet of just [my CO] and myself but rather stem from much larger 
problems that existed between the two units from way back.”  He stated that when he 
first arrived at the station, the CO and XPO had told him that they “were counting on 
me to ‘save the crew’—I was told that my only concern was to fix their battered morale 
and get them ready to perform the Coast Guard’s missions.”  He claimed that commu-
nications had been improving. 
 

 
The  applicant  stated  that  early  on  during  his  tour  as  OIC,  he  was  frequently 
working away from the station but that his normal workday was 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.  
However,  after  his  wife  fell  ill  and  became  bed  ridden  in  January  2003,  he  started  to 
leave the station once or twice a day to check on her.  Then one day she fell down the 
stairs, and his visits home “did increase in frequency and duration.”  He stated that at a 
meeting with his chain of command on August 8, 2003, he learned that they had consid-
ered replacing him “during this trying time for me and my wife” and that he wished 
that they had done so “as I was doing 20-hour days for three months, between my wife, 
the home, and the USCG.”  After his wife recovered, he returned to his normal routine 
and took two weeks of leave before the District Commander’s visit to get rejuvenated. 
 
 
Regarding the allegations about his uniform, the applicant stated that the cover-
alls he wore had been approved and purchased by the parent command “as a replace-
ment for the Working Blue uniform … due to the deteriorating condition and non-avail-
ability of uniform items during the transition to the ODU.”  Furthermore, he stated that 
an ALDIST bulletin issued in 1999 had authorized printed T-shirts to be worn “for rec-
ognition during special training or law enforcement events.” 
 
 
Regarding his refusal to attend a meeting at the parent command, the applicant 
stated  that  a  BM3  at  his  unit  had  jumped  the  chain  of  command  and  called  the  CO 
directly to complain about a missing piece of mail.  The CO had called the station and 
sarcastically “ripped into” a chief petty officer about their station’s alleged inability to 
process the mail even though the chief petty officer was able to find the BM3’s letter in 
less than a minute.  The applicant was upset about the CO’s attitude and about the fact 
that the CO had allowed the BM3 to jump the chain of command.  After a few telephone 
calls between the chief petty officer, the CO, and the parent command’s XPO, the XPO 
called the applicant and said that the CO wanted to see him “right now.”  Therefore, the 
applicant replied, “Not if all he is going to do is call me an asshole because of where I 
am stationed.”  Later that day, after “things cool[ed] down a little,” the applicant called 
the CO and arranged to meet for breakfast the next day. 
 
 
Regarding  his  alleged  gun-dealing  business,  the  applicant  stated  that  although 
he did not have a dealer’s license, his firearms license entitled him to make individual 
sales.  Therefore, he “would make and receive transfers of firearms for members of the 
crew, for firearms that they were buying or selling on Internet auctions.”  However, he 
stopped doing it when members from other units began asking him to do the same for 
them.  He  stated that two members had seen him and a chief petty officer opening a 
package that contained a rifle that the chief petty officer had sold on the Internet, but 
that the applicant had done so only to put the proper paperwork inside.  Furthermore, 
he noted that of the 150 websites the investigator had listed, only “a little over 50 are 
firearm specific sites” and that only 4 of his 35 “favorites” were firearm websites.  More-
over, he alleged that he did not pursue this interest “all that often” and that he “spen[t] 

far more time downloading manuals and educational material for the crew then I do on 
firearms-related websites.” 
 
Regarding the computer purchases, the applicant stated that his CO knew about 
 
the purchases and that the Administrative Officer had authorized them.  His crew felt 
that they could sit on old furniture to use new computers but “no one was too keen on 
sitting at new desks with nothing to do.”  He stated that he had set up the members’ 
accounts on the computers, but a few weeks later was told not to use them because they 
had not been purchased properly.  He stated that he kept the laptop in his office and 
that some of the petty officers used it occasionally.  He stated that the laptop was likely 
“scrubbed” because one week before LCDR D’s investigation, the XPO “told me that the 
Group  was  planning  on  taking  both of  the computers  from  us  and  to  clean  and  back 
them up.” 
 
 
Regarding his comments to the District Commander, the applicant stated that at 
the time of the visit, processing of two alcohol incidents had been pending since Febru-
ary and that he had made multiple phone calls about them to his parent command and 
to the Command Master Chief.  One of the February incidents was the member’s second 
alcohol incident and so involved a long delayed discharge package.  He stated that he 
mentioned one of the June incidents because it was the second alcohol incident of one of 
the members who had had his first alcohol incident in February, which had never been 
processed.  The applicant stated that some members had developed a cavalier attitude, 
and that he had grown very frustrated with the parent command’s lack of response. 
 
 
Regarding the painting of his office prior to the District Commander’s visit, the 
applicant claimed that he had “a whole room full of people that heard me tell the MAA, 
before he even got started, that he did not have time to finish my office and that there 
was more important work to do.  He just seemed hell-bent on finishing.” 
  
 
Regarding  the  poor  relationship  and  communications  between  the  station  and 
the parent command, the applicant stated that the station had made many requests for 
assistance and support to no avail and that he had been told he was a “pain in the butt” 
when  he  had  asked  for  help.    He  stated  that  he  had  “tried  very  hard  to  keep  things 
behind closed doors,” when he felt that the parent command was acting unreasonably 
but that he had “no cadre to make an ‘inner circle’” and so sometimes “confided in a 
mix of duty personnel and the most senior PO onboard.  Ultimately, I realize, that none 
of  this  is  an  excuse  and  I  have  made  some  inexcusable  mistakes  out  of  frustration.”  
However, the applicant stated, he had developed his crew to “a level equal to or better 
than any other … Station in the District, … [and] made this Station much better than I 
found it.” 
 
 
On August 28, 2003, the Group Commander forwarded the applicant’s statement 
to  the  District  Commander  with  his  “strongest  recommendation  for  relief  for  cause 

based on my loss of confidence in [the applicant]. … My issues with [him] have become 
a  long  and  continuous  saga  of  multiple  illustrations  of  his  lack  of  competence  as  a 
leader, his lack of willingness to work with his chain of command to solve issues, and 
his apparent disregard for establishing a command presence at his unit, or adhering to 
our core values.  Every member of my staff who has been or will be involved with [the 
applicant] in the operation of his unit is convinced he will continue to be a leadership 
challenge as long as he remains in the OIC position.” 
 
 
Commander stated the following: 
 

In response to the applicant’s statement concerning his wife’s illness, the Group 

If the chain of command had been advised of the severity of the undocumented condition 
of  [the  applicant’s]  wife,  the  command  would  have  asked  for  assistance  to  ensure  the 
Chief received the support he and his wife required, and the unit continued to receive the 
support  and  leadership  it  required.    Although  it  is  true  [the  CO]  gave  [the  applicant] 
permission to tend to his wife’s needs during her sickness, [the applicant] never made his 
command or the Group aware of the extensive amount of time he was going to be away 
from  his  unit.    During  the  investigation,  [the  applicant]  made  contradictory  statements 
about the amount of time he was away from work.  In his 30 July statement, he says he 
went home 2 or 3 times a day to check on his wife, and that he did this for several weeks.  
In his 22 August statement, he states he was away a lot in January-March, and after his 
wife had a fall in April, he went home more often and for longer periods of time.  In his 
verbal  statement  to  me,  the  Chief  indicated  the  period  of  sickness  lasted  for  about  3 
months.  Depending on which statement is accurate, there still is no accountability for the 
months  of  May,  June  or  July  and  these  are  the  months  the  unit  personnel  most  likely 
would  have  focused  on  during  the  investigation,  when  asked  about  the  Chief’s  work 
habits.  No one knows for sure just how much time the Chief was away from work, but 
the appearance is that he was only there for 3 hours at a time.  …  There never was a dis-
cussion … [of] bringing someone in to run the station during his wife’s sickness.  No one 
in his chain of command was aware of the amount of time the Chief was taking off. 

 
 
Regarding the applicant’s dress, the Group Commander stated that the CO had 
purchased the coveralls and laid out clear guidelines that they were to be worn over the 
working blue uniforms in certain work situations “to help prolong their life.”  He stated 
that the applicant had “freely admitted to routinely violating these guidelines,” which 
set a poor example.  In addition, he stated that the applicant had told one member of the 
Group Commander’s staff that “he felt wearing his tropical uniform created a separa-
tion between him and his crew; therefore he chose to wear the coveralls … [and] wore 
sweats and a T-shirt at least twice a week, and never bothered to put on any type of uni-
form.”  The Group Commander further stated that the 1999 ALDIST that the applicant 
cited regarding his use of SWAT-style clothing provided that a program manager could 
authorize  special  uniforms  in  situations  where  a  Coast  Guard  uniform  was  not  suffi-
cient for mission requirements.  The Group Commander noted that the ALDIST did not 
authorize printed T-shirts and included “five passages … urging pre-purchase verifica-
tion  of  the  appropriateness  of  the  intended  organizational  clothing,”  as  well  as  “an 

admonishment  that  failure  to  follow  proper  procedures  may  result  in  the  individual 
being held personally liable.”  
 
Regarding the applicant’s alleged gun-dealing business, the Group Commander 
 
stated  that  the  applicant  had  admitted  to  him  spending  up  to  two  hours  at  a  time 
researching  guns  on  the  Internet  while  at  work.    Regarding  the  two  computers,  the 
Group Commander stated that the CO told the applicant only that he could research the 
matter and that any such research would  have revealed that the  purchase  was  illegal 
and not in line with the Group’s and District’s plans.  The Group Commander further 
stated that the laptop had cat hair imbedded between the keys and in the cooling fan 
inlet and that the applicant had explained that his wife had thrown a blanket covered 
with cat hair on top of the computer when it was in his closet at home. 
  
Regarding  preparations  for  the  District  Commander’s  visit,  the  Group  Com-
 
mander stated that his concern was not so much about when and how the applicant’s 
office got painted but about “the lack of cleanliness and order I observed throughout 
the unit during the visit.  It started with the Chief’s office being disorganized and ended 
with the messy and disorganized garage storage area.” 
 
 
The Group Commander stated that the applicant’s CO had “made very attempt 
to support the unit and its personnel.  In many cases, [the applicant] advised [the CO] 
that he would take care of the issues at his unit and he did not require any assistance.  
Throughout [the applicant’s] tenure as OIC, there have been conflicting stories between 
what he says took place and what others say took place.  [The applicant] consistently 
provided different versions of what happened, what others said or what others meant. 
…  These  conflicting  stories  do  not  stop  at  his  unit  or  with  his  subordinates;  they run 
right up through his entire chain of command.” 
 
Request for Permanent Relief for Cause 
 

On September 8, 2003, the District Commander asked the Commandant to per-
manently  relieve  the  applicant  from  his  duties  as  OIC  for  cause,  noting  that  despite 
repeated  counseling,  the  applicant  had  failed  to  establish  command  presence,  was 
unwilling to align his priorities with those of his parent command, and was unable to 
communicate effectively with his chain of command. 

 
Also on September 8, 2003, the Group Commander entered a negative page 7 in 

the applicant’s record stating the following: 
 

[A]t approximately 2230 on the evening of 11 Aug 2003, you initiated an encounter with a 
subordinate  member  of  your  unit  in  the  housing  area  at  Station  …  .  In  that  encounter, 
you approached the member while carrying a firearm that you had been working on, and 
began to question the member concerning statements contained in a recently completed 
investigation  regarding  the  good  order  and  discipline  at  Station  …  .    Even  though  the 

firearm was neither operable nor loaded, its presence combined with the lateness of hour 
and the subject and tone of your conversation created an intimidating and coercive envi-
ronment. 
 
Your conduct in this encounter was completely inappropriate, especially for a Chief Petty 
Officer … and an Officer in Charge of a Coast Guard unit.  Your actions demonstrated a 
lack of appreciation for your rank and command position, a lack of judgment, and a lack 
of respect for your subordinates. 
 
Further  incidents  of  this  nature  will  not  be  tolerated.    I  urge  you  to  take  this  matter  to 
heart  and  to  make  the  changes  necessary  to  align  your  personal  conduct  with  that 
expected of Coast Guard leaders. 

 
 
On  September  9,  2003,  the  applicant  acknowledged  notification  of  the  District 
Commander’s  recommendation  that  he  be  permanently  relieved  for  cause.    He  indi-
cated that he desired counsel and would submit a statement. 
 

Applicant’s Statement Concerning Permanent Relief for Cause 
 
 
 
On September 16, 2003, the applicant submitted a statement concerning the Dis-
trict Commander’s recommendation that he be relieved for cause.  The applicant stated 
that he realized “the inevitable outcome of this matter and do not dispute that I have 
made some grievous mistakes, mostly by way of inaction on my part—I assure you that 
I not only recognize, but accept my personal mistakes and shortcomings. … I am mak-
ing this statement of my own mind and volition, with the sole purpose of preserving 
my integrity and reputation, in areas where I feel I have fell victim to innuendo, coinci-
dence or simple fallacies.”  The applicant stated that both his CO and XPO were aware 
of the severity of his wife’s condition and that he always advised them when he was 
leaving the station for medical appointments.  He noted that he had also reported his 
wife’s condition to the command’s Work-Life Staff. 
 
 
The  applicant  further stated  that  he  himself  had  set the  guidelines  for  wearing 
coveralls at the station and the CO had not complained even though he had visited the 
station  and  seen  the  crew  wearing  them.    He  further  stated  that  the  SWAT-style 
uniform he and another member had donned for patrolling the dock during a July 4th 
biker  rally  had  been  issued  at  other  units  and  he  “did  not  believe  the  decision  to 
authorized them for one hour, during this special security event, was out of line.”  He 
wrote  that  while  he  may  have  made  a  mistake,  “the  decision  was  made  largely  to 
facilitate  the  recognition  of  the  mandated  shore  side  security  personnel  and  in  the 
interest of public safety.” 
 
 
Regarding the allegation that he was conducting a gun-dealing business from his 
office, the applicant stated that he had made only three private transfers; received two 
firearms for members who purchased them online; shipped two firearms; and received 
one repair part.  The applicant explained his Internet use by saying that he was not con-
ducting a business but studying firemark and toolmark examination for forensic pur-
poses as he wanted “to complete my online courses from American Institute of Applied 
Science  and  ultimately  become  recognized  by  the  Firearm  and  Toolmark  Examiners 
Guild.” 
 
Regarding the computers, the applicant stated that the parent command knew of 
the purchases since the Administrative Officer had authorized them.  He further stated 
that he had a personal computer at home and no need for the laptop.  He stated that he 
had taken it home only “to prepare the script and Power Point show for the Chiefs Call 
To Initiation” and had not used it otherwise.  He further stated that before he donated a 
DVD player to the station, the crew had used the laptop to watch movies in the evening.  
In addition, a BM1 had “set up purchasing suppliers and information on it and people 
had used it for their distance learning studies among other things.  I do not own a cat; 
perhaps someone else that used it does?  Use of the laptop was terminated shortly after 

it was purchased, at the direction of my Command, purportedly from the Group, due to 
the purchase being in question.” 

 
Regarding the orderliness of the station during the District Commander’s visit, 
the applicant admitted that it was “poor and showed a general lack of effort.  I did let 
the crew and my Command down on this.”  He stated that he had intended to return to 
work  from  leave  two  days  before  the  visit  but  that,  at  the  urging  of  his  senior  crew-
members who knew his wife’s situation, had stayed on leave until the morning of the 
visit.  They had assured him that “they would have everything in line for the visit.”  He 
was  very  upset  when  he  arrived  and  saw  that  so  little  had  been  done,  although  “the 
overall  condition  and  appearance  of  the  facility  [had]  improved  drastically”  since  he 
took over as OIC. 

 
Regarding the night of August 11, 2003, the applicant stated that the item he was 
 
carrying was not really a gun but a pistol grip that was not capable of chambering or 
firing a round.  He stated that he spoke to BM2 X about the investigation because he 
had been told that he could solicit statements on his own behalf as long as he did not do 
so on station grounds or while on duty, which meant that he could only speak to them 
in the evenings in or near their housing.  He advised BM2 X that another member had 
been  “grossly  misquoted”  by  the  investigator.    When  BM2  X  pursued  the  topic,  the 
applicant “told him that this was neither the time nor the place to discuss it and that if 
he  was  really  concerned,  [he]  would  talk  to  him  about  it  later.”    Afterwards,  the 
incident “became more and more inflamed … largely due to [BM2 X] lampooning the 
situation  and  using  it  to  draw  attention  …  saying  things  about  ‘not  standing  by 
windows,’ barricading his house and zigzagging while crossing the parking lot.” 
 
 
The  applicant  stated  that  he  tried  to  keep  the  lines  of  communication  open 
between the station and the parent command.  Following his meeting with the Deputy 
Group Commander in January 2003, he sent out a weekly “sitrep” by email each Mon-
day, but stopped when the XPO told him that the CO was not happy with them.  He 
then  invited  the  parent  command  department  heads  to  visit  twice  a  month,  but  they 
soon stopped doing so.  Thereafter, he and BMC L tried to visit the parent command 
every Tuesday, but on their fourth visit they were told not to continue driving down. 
 
 
On the applicant’s performance evaluation dated September 30, 2003, he received 
three marks of 3, fifteen marks of 4, five marks of 5, and one mark of 6.  He was not rec-
ommended for promotion. 
 
Permanent Relief for Cause 
 
On October 9, 2003, the Acting Commandant approved the District Command-
 
er’s  request  to  permanently  relieve  the  applicant  from  his  position  as  OIC  for  cause 
based on the District Commander’s “loss of confidence in his judgment and ability to 

effectively perform his assigned duties.”  He noted that the applicant would remain at 
the  parent  command  on  a  temporary  basis  until  he  received  transfer  orders,  which 
would arrive no later than October 31, 2003. 
 

On  December  3,  2003,  the  Group  Commander  formally  advised  the  applicant 
that  his  relief  for  cause  was  permanent  in  that  his  certification  as  OIC  had  been 
removed. 
 
 
cant received high marks and was recommended for advancement. 
 

On  his  performance  evaluations  dated  September  30,  2004  and  2005,  the  appli-

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

On  November  29,  2005,  the  Judge  Advocate  General  (JAG)  of  the Coast  Guard 

 
 
submitted an advisory opinion in which he recommended that the Board deny relief.  
 

The JAG pointed out that the applicant did not argue that his relief for cause was 
unjustified  but  that  he  has  suffered  an  injustice  because  neither  he  nor  his  command 
recognized that he was suffering from depression at the time and that his depression 
caused the behavior that led to his relief for cause.  The JAG stated that for purposes of 
the  BCMRs,  “injustice”  is  “treatment  by  military  authorities  that  ‘shocks  the  sense  of 
justice.’”  Sawyer v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 860, 868 (Cl. Ct. 1989) (citing Reale v. United 
States, 208 Ct. Cl. 1010, 1011 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 (1976)).  The JAG 
argued that the applicant’s relief for cause does not meet this standard as his superiors 
had lost confidence in his judgment and ability to lead and the applicant was afforded 
all due process. 

 
The JAG adopted the findings of a  memorandum on this  case prepared by the 
Coast Guard Personnel Command (CGPC).  CGPC stated that under Article 4.F.2. of the 
Personnel  Manual,  the  District  Commander  had  authority  to  relieve  the  applicant  for 
cause temporarily pending approval of a permanent relief for cause by the Comman-
dant.    CGPC  stated  that  under  Article  4.F.3.,  loss  of  confidence  on  the  part  of  one’s 
superiors  is  a  proper  basis  for  a  removal  for  cause.    CGPC  stated  that  the  applicant 
received all due process during his relief for cause in accordance with Article 4.F.4. in 
that he was notified by the District Commander of both the temporary relief for cause 
and the recommendation for permanent relief for cause and he was allowed to submit 
statement on his own behalf on each occasion. 

 
CGPC stated that “[r]egardless of any underlying medical diagnosis, the position 
of Officer in Charge requires the trust and confidence of superiors. … While the Appli-
cant may have come to a realization that his actions were not proper and that he possi-
bly  suffered  from  an  undiagnosed  mental  health  condition,  he  was  afforded  due 
process and his Relief for Cause was consistent with his performance. … His belief that 

he  ‘fell  through  the  cracks’  regarding  medical  treatment  does  not  substantiate  this 
[requested] record correction.” 

 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
 
On December 20, 2005, the applicant responded to the views of the Coast Guard.  
The applicant stated that, although he “do[es] not dispute the conduct or events in gen-
eral,” the allegation that he was conducting a private business from his office “is pat-
ently  false.”    In  addition,  on  August  11,  2003,  he  was  merely  showing  a  pistol  grip, 
rather  than  a  complete  firearm,  to  a  crewmember,  BM2  X,  who  shared  his  interest  in 
gun collecting.  Moreover, BM2 X himself was holding the pistol grip “for most of our 
conversation.” 
 
The applicant argued that even if his relief for cause while suffering from depres-
 
sion does not shock the Board’s sense of justice, the Board should consider the interest 
of equity as well. He noted that while attending Chief Petty Officer’s Academy, a Rear 
Admiral had noted that “two things the Coast Guard does not do very well” were cop-
ing with alcohol problems and suicides.  He alleged that he himself had contemplated 
suicide and that “many believe that my Relief process was largely precipitated by my 
outspoken  disdain  towards  my  Command’s  passive  handling  of  alcohol  incidents 
within the Group.” 
 
 
The applicant stated that he applied to the BCMR because fellow members who 
knew him well were shocked by his relief for cause because it was not in keeping with 
his prior documented level of performance.  He and others believe that because of the 
obvious  change in the quality of his performance,  someone should have realized that 
something was not right with him.  He alleged that his Group Commander, who had 
signed  an  excellent  performance  evaluation  for  him  in  September  2002,  noticed  the 
change in him and yet took no action to help him.  The applicant argued that it was not 
the relief for cause that was the original injustice but the fact that his chain of command 
did not recognize the underlying cause of the decline in his behavior and get help for 
him.  He argued that he has suffered a personal injustice because his depression went 
unrecognized and untreated.  He stated that he continues to suffer from the stigma of 
the event and the debilitating effect it has had on his career. 
 

APPLICABLE REGULATIONS 

 

Article 4.F.1.a. of the Personnel Manual states that “relief for cause” (RFC) is “the 
administrative removal of a commanding officer (CO) or officer in charge (OIC) from 
his or her current duty assignment before the planned rotation date.”  It “normally con-
sists of a two-step process: 1. The flag officer in the unit’s chain of command orders a 
temporary  RFC;  and  2.  Commandant  …  orders  a  permanent  RFC after  reviewing  the 
case.” 

 

Article  4.F.1.b.1.  states  that  “[t]he  need  to  Relieve  for  Cause  may  arise  when  a 
CO’s or OIC’s performance or conduct adversely affects his or her unit’s morale, good 
order  and  discipline,  and/or  mission  performance.    One  of  the  most  severe  adminis-
trative  measures  taken  against  a  member  in  command,  RFC  usually  has  a  significant 
adverse impact on the member’s future Coast Guard career, particularly on his or her 
promotion,  advancement,  duty  and  special  assignments,  and  selection  for  schools. 
Therefore, the relieving officer must carefully consider the circumstances’ gravity and 
the potential outcome’s total implications before initiating the process.” 
 

Article  4.F.2.a.  states  that  “[d]irector  chiefs  (for  Headquarters  units  under  their 
program),  area  commanders,  district  commanders,  and  commanders  of  maintenance 
and logistics commands have the authority to temporarily relieve a CO or OIC in their 
chain of command for cause.”  Article 4.F.2.b. provides that “[o]nly Commandant … can 
order permanent Relief for Cause.” 
 
 
Article  4.F.3.  provides  that  the  bases  for  relief  for  cause  may  be  misconduct, 
unsatisfactory  performance,  unacceptable  relationships,  or  loss  of  confidence.    Article 
4.F.3.c. states the following with regard to loss of confidence: 
 

It is imperative his or her immediate superiors have full confidence in a member’s judg-
ment and ability to command due to the unique position of trust and responsibility he or 
she  occupies; his  or  her role in shaping  morale, good order, and discipline in the com-
mand;  and  his  or  her  influence  on  mission  requirements  and  command  readiness.    An 
articulated, fact-supported loss of confidence is a sufficient basis for RFC. 

 
 
Article 4.F.4. states that “[a]fter deciding to institute the temporary RFC process, 
the relieving authority must “[n]otify the member in writing of the “action being taken 
and the reason for it” and of “[h]is or her right to submit a statement in writing on his 
or her behalf within five working days.”  If grounds for a permanent relief for cause are 
substantiated, the relieving authority should ”recommend the CO’s or OIC’s permanent 
RFC and send appropriate documentation to the Commandant.”  Article 4.F.6. provides 
that  when  being  recommended  for  a  permanent  RFC,  the  member  must  have  “the 
opportunity to make a statement on his or her behalf (normally five working days).”  In 
addition,  “[t]he  command  must  afford  the  member  the  advice  of  counsel  within  the 
meaning of UCMJ Article 27(b)(1) during the temporary RFC process and in preparing 
any statement he or she submits about the permanent RFC request.” 
 

Article 10.B.6.a.3. of the Personnel Manual provides the following guidelines for 
evaluating  the  performance  of  “members  with  a  limited  opportunity  to  perform  for 
reasons such as illness, injuries, [and] pregnancy”: 

 
a.  Occasionally, circumstances resulting from a temporary condition may limit a mem-
ber’s  opportunity  to  perform.    These  circumstances  may  cause  specific  performance 

restrictions;  e.g.,  those  imposed  by  a  medical  authority,  and  may  even  require  restruc-
turing  or  reassigning  duties.    While  rating  chains  shall  not  give  preferential  treatment, 
commanding  officers  shall  ensure  these  individuals  do  not  receive  adverse  employee 
reviews solely for these circumstances. 
 
b.  In consultation with the health care provider, the commanding officer must establish a 
“reasonable expectation of performance” in the member’s current circumstances.  In par-
ticular,  the  commanding  officer  must  determine  whether  a  member  requires  reassign-
ment to a different work environment, restrictions on performing specific types of tasks, 
or  reduced  work  hours.    When  considering  reassigning  or  restructuring  duties,  com-
manding officers should strive to identify service needs, which compliment the member’s 
temporary limited abilities. 

 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

 
The Board makes the following findings and conclusions on the basis of the ap-
 
plicant's  military  record  and  submissions,  the  Coast  Guard's  submissions,  and  appli-
cable law: 
 

1. 

The  Board  has  jurisdiction  concerning  this  matter  pursuant  to  10  U.S.C. 

§ 1552.  The application was timely. 
 

2. 

Absent specific evidence to the contrary, the Board presumes that a mem-
ber’s  military  records  are  correct  and  that  Coast  Guard  officers  have  acted  correctly, 
lawfully,  and  in  good  faith  in  performing  their  duties.  33 C.F.R.  § 52.24(b);  Arens  v. 
United States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 
813 (Ct. Cl. 1979).  The applicant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the relief for cause, the page 7s related to his relief for cause, and his per-
formance evaluation dated September 30, 2003, are erroneous or unjust and that it is in 
the interest of justice that they be removed. 

 
3. 

Although  the  applicant  disputed  some  of  his  command’s  conclusions 
about his behavior, he has admitted that his command justifiably lost confidence in his 
ability to serve as OIC of the station.  Rather than arguing that his relief for cause was 
per se erroneous or unjust, the applicant argued that evidence of his poor performance 
during the period in question should be removed from his record because he was suf-
fering from depression and the depression caused his poor performance.  He argued in 
essence that because his depression caused his poor performance and he is now being 
treated,  he  should  be  given  a  “clean  slate”  so  that  he  will  have  another  chance  to 
assume a position of command.  The applicant is, in effect, seeking clemency so that his 
career will not continue to be hampered by the documentation of his poor performance 
as an OIC. 
 
 
The applicant admitted that he did not seek psychological or psychiatric 
help prior to his removal for cause as OIC.  Although the applicant has not proved that 

4. 

he was suffering from depression prior to his removal for cause, it is possible that he 
was, given the evidence in the record.  Moreover, the applicant has not proved that his 
alleged depression caused the instances of poor performance that resulted in his chain 
of command losing confidence in his leadership.   
 

5. 

The Group Commander indicated in his reports to the District Command-
er that one of his most significant concerns was the applicant’s tendency to relate events 
and interpret conversations differently than both his subordinates and superiors.  LCDR 
D  had  reported  that  crewmembers  complained  about  the  applicant  telling  lies.    The 
Group  Commander  noted  that  the  applicant  (a)  originally  claimed  that  the  CO  had 
approved  the  purchase  of  two  computers  but  then  admitted  that  the  CO  did  not; 
(b) when speaking to the District Commander, made it sound like his own station per-
sonnel  had  five  alcohol  incidents  for  which  processing  had  been  long  delayed  by  the 
parent  command;  and  (c)  made  contradictory  statements  about  how  much  time  he 
spent away from the office.  The Group Commander advised the District Commander 
that  “[t]hroughout  [the  applicant’s]  tenure  as  OIC,  there  have  been  conflicting  stories 
between what he says took place and what others say took place.  [The applicant] con-
sistently provided different versions of what happened, what others said or what others 
meant. … These conflicting stories do not stop at his unit or with his subordinates; they 
run right up through his entire chain of command.”  As an apparent lack of credibility 
on the applicant’s part was clearly a primary cause of his chain of command’s loss of 
confidence, the Board is not persuaded that his relief for cause was attributable primar-
ily to his alleged depression. 
 
 
The  applicant  argued  that  when  his  performance  declined,  his  superiors 
should have guessed that he was ill and made sure that he got psychological or psychia-
tric help.  The facts do not support this conclusion.  Because he was the OIC of a station 
geographically  removed  from  the  parent  command,  his  chain  of  command  had  little 
opportunity to observe his day-to-day conduct.  Furthermore, the applicant’s own con-
duct masked some of the poor performance that he claims was an outward sign of the 
alleged depression.  The Board is not persuaded that, under the circumstances of this 
case, the applicant’s command was remiss in not sending him for a mental health eval-
uation.  
 
 
The record indicates that the applicant received all due process in accor-
dance  with  Article  4.F.  of  the  Personnel  Manual  during  his  relief  for  cause.    He  was 
allowed to consult counsel and submit a statement in his own behalf when the Group 
Commander  recommended  temporary  relief  for  cause  and  again  when  the  District 
Commander recommended his permanent relief for cause. 
 
If the applicant had sought mental health treatment while he was OIC of 
 
the  station  and  if  he  had  been  diagnosed  with  depression,  his  physician  might  have 
recommended to the applicant’s chain of command that his duties be adjusted.  Under 

6. 

7. 

8. 

Article 10.B.6.a.3. of the Personnel Manual, his command would have been required to 
ensure that he did not receive an adverse performance evaluation solely because of his 
condition.  However, whether the applicant suffered from depression while he was OIC, 
the extent to which the alleged depression affected his performance, and the extent to 
which his chain of command’s disapproval resulted specifically from depression-influ-
enced performance are entirely speculative at this point.  The Board will not remove a 
performance evaluation from a member’s record based on speculative suppositions. 
 

9. 

10. 

The record contains numerous allegations by the applicant concerning the 
actions and attitudes of various personnel in his chain of command and at his station.  
Those allegations not specifically addressed above are considered to be not dispositive 
of the case. 
 
In light of the above, the Board finds that the applicant has not proved by 
 
a preponderance of the evidence that the continued existence of his removal for cause, 
the page 7s, and the poor performance evaluation in his record constitutes an error or 
injustice or that those documents should be removed from his record in the interest of 
justice. 
 
 
 

11.  Accordingly, the applicant’s request should be denied. 

 
 
 
 

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES APPEAR ON NEXT PAGE]

The  application  of  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,  USCG,  for  correction  of  his  military 

ORDER 

 

 
 

record is denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

        

 
 Frank H. Esposito 

 

 

 
 Jordan S. Fried 

 

 

 
 William R. Kraus 

 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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  • CG | BCMR | Retirement Cases | 2005-166

    Original file (2005-166.pdf) Auto-classification: Denied

    Regarding the applicant’s removal as TCIC and transfer from Operations to the Investigations Division, the DOT IG stated that it occurred “after a confrontation between him and [CWO X] over the number of days [the applicant] had worked with- out a day off” and that there may have been “significant miscommunication surround- ing the issue.” CWO X stated that the incident was “the straw that broke the camel’s back” and “stressed that [he] had verbally counseled [the applicant] on numerous...

  • CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2008-018

    Original file (2008-018.pdf) Auto-classification: Denied

    Most of the performance categories on the SOER are marked “not observed,” but the low marks of 2 for “Results/Effectiveness” and “Professional Competence” are supported by the following comments by the XO of the XXX squadron, who was the applicant’s Supervi- sor:5 Relieved of primary duty as a flight instructor pilot due to unsatisfactory performance in the Fixed- wing Instructor Training Unit (FITU) instructor training syllabus, a demonstrated lack of stan- dardization, and an attitude not...

  • CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2007-196

    Original file (2007-196.pdf) Auto-classification: Denied

    The reporting officer further stated: In block 7 of the OER, the reporting officer concurred with the supervisor’s marks and In the leadership section of the disputed OER, the applicant received a mark of 6 in “looking out for others,” marks of 5 in “developing others,” “directing others,” and “evaluations,” and marks of 3 in “workplace climate” and “teamwork.” The supervisors wrote the following in the comment block: [The applicant] was presented opportunities to learn critical new skills...

  • CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2008-066

    Original file (2008-066.pdf) Auto-classification: Denied

    On March 19, xxxx, the RO forwarded to the District Commander the report of the investigation into the grounding of the XXXX on December 2, xxxx. In light of CDR L’s assessment of the RO’s behavior on March 12, xxxx, when the applicant exercised her right to remain silent and consult an attorney; the EPO’s statement about receiving an email on March 12, xxxx, inviting the crew to attend a public mast the fol- lowing Friday; and the Family Advocacy Specialist’s description of the RO’s...

  • CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2002-103

    Original file (2002-103.pdf) Auto-classification: Denied

    In response to the applicant's OER reply, the supervisor stated that he received direct input from the applicant previous supervisor, who had been the applicant's supervisor for 40% of the reporting period. There are statements from the LT and CWO4 that the reporting officer treated the applicant abusively at a QMB meeting. However, it was the CO's meeting and not that of the reporting officer.

  • CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2006-003

    Original file (2006-003.pdf) Auto-classification: Denied

    The Group Commander, his commanding officer (CO) had him removed from his duties as Deputy Group Commander on September 22, 2004. # CATEGORY 3a Planning and Preparedness MARK WRITTEN COMMENTS 3 3b Using Resources 3c Results/ Effectiveness 3d Adaptability 3e Professional Competence 4a Speaking and Listening 4b Writing 5a Looking Out for Others 5b Developing Others 5c Directing Others 5d Teamwork 5e Workplace Climate 5f Evaluations 4 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 6 3 8a Initiative 8b Judgment 8c...

  • CG | BCMR | Advancement and Promotion | 2010-081

    Original file (2010-081.pdf) Auto-classification: Denied

    It states that the BO “has the respon- sibility of coordinating the boarding” and “will also notify the Sector OPCEN and the Response Dept Head when the boarding team departs for the boarding.” The applicant concluded by repeating his claims that because he could not appeal the Page 7 given the departure of his rating chain, that CDR X should have counseled him on an OER instead, and that the principle that requires masking of ensign OERs should also apply to Page 7s, but that since the Page...